Why is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?

QIN Yaqing

Abstract: There is not yet a Chinese international relations theory (IRT) mainly due to three factors: the unconsciousness of ‘international-ness’ in the traditional Chinese worldview, the dominance of the Western IR discourse in the Chinese academic community, and the absence of a consistent theoretical core in the Chinese IR research. A Chinese IRT is likely and even inevitable to emerge along with the great economic and social transformation that China has been experiencing and by exploring the essence of the Chinese intellectual tradition. The Tianxia worldview and the Tributary System in the two millennia of China's history, the radical thinking and revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and reform and opening-up since 1978 are the three milestones of China's ideational and practical development and therefore could provide rich nutrition for a Chinese IRT. In addition, a Chinese IRT is likely to develop around the core problematic of China's identity vis-à-vis international society, a century-long puzzle for the Chinese and the world alike.

The Chinese IR community has a keen interest in IR theory (IRT). In addition, China is a land where there are long intellectual traditions and has been a major international player in history. Then why is there no Chinese IRT? In this article, I try to provide an answer to this question and argue that there is a great potential for Chinese IRT to emerge and evolve.

1. Social theory: definition and classification

Theory is a system of ideas. Most authoritative dictionaries define theory as a system of generalizations, able to account for facts and associated with practice (Oxford, 1971, p. 3284; Webster, 1986, p. 2371; Cihai, 1980, p. 1213). Once we enter the field of IR, we immediately face two definitions of theory, although neither is a violation of the general definition provided by those authoritative dictionaries. As Acharya and Buzan state in their article in this volume, there are two definitions: the harder positivist definition of theory dominant in the United States and the softer reflectivist definition prevalent in Europe. While the former strictly explains causal relations and contains ‘testable hypotheses of a causal nature’, the latter is ‘anything that organizes a field systematically, structures questions, and establishes a coherent and rigorous set of interrelated concepts and categories’ (Acharya and Buzan, 2007).

While accepting this basic definition, I need to clarify the meanings of theory when the term is used in the Chinese context, where there are two kinds of ‘theory’. One is action oriented, defining theory as guidelines for action. Mao's ‘leaning toward one side’ strategy (alliance with the Soviet Union) and his theory on the three worlds are examples because this type of theory, or strategic thinking, is used to provide principles for policy-making and has immediate relevance to action. The other is knowledge oriented, defining theory as a perspective to understand the world and as an achievement of knowledge production or reproduction, such as the theory of Waltz and Bull. As
Acharya and Buzan defines, theory is about abstracting away from the facts of day-to-day events in an attempt to find patterns and group things together into sets and classes of things. This in essence is a knowledge-oriented definition, which is used in this article. By using this sense, I do not mean that the action- and knowledge-oriented theories have no relations at all. The first, after carefully theorizing, can become the second, but the two have, from the very beginning, different purposes.

Theory-related research is of three different, but interrelated, types: (i) original theory, which is new theory incommensurable to the existing theories (Type I), (ii) introductory and critical analysis of an original theory (Type II), and (iii) application and testing of a theory (Type III). An original theory contains core assumptions that are not commensurable with core assumptions in another distinct theory (Kuhn, 1970). If the core component is different, then it can be a distinct research program or paradigm. Introductory and critical analysis of an original theory contains no such distinctions and develops no new theory, but either presents a good account of an original theory or criticizes it. The third type includes many tests of an original theory. Its merits lie in the verification and falsification of the theory concerned through applying it to social reality.

When we say that there is no Chinese IRT, we use the knowledge-oriented meaning of theory and the first type of theory thereof as the defining standard, or we mean that Type I theory is yet to emerge from the IR community in China.

2. IR discipline in China: state of the art

There has been a lot of discussion about how to develop IRT in China (Wang, 2002; Johnston, 2002). In this section, I will discuss three factors, i.e. the institutional development, the contribution by translation, and the research in the Chinese IR community. On the basis of my account of the state of the art in China, I argue that Type I theory is yet to emerge although great progress has been made and that there is a great potential for a Chinese School of IRT with Type I theory as its core.

2.1 Institutional development

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, three stages of institutional building can be identified in China's IR development. The first is from 1953 to 1963. The PRC set up its first IR-related department level program in 1953 within the Remin University of China, which was named Department of Diplomatic Studies. Two years later, it was re-established as an independent institution, Foreign Affairs College.1 Its mission was to train China's diplomats and do research in IR, although the former was the more important. Later on, two other institutes were established. One was the Institute of International Relations and the other was the Institute of International Politics.2 These two institutions, like Foreign Affairs College, were mainly established to satisfy the immediate need for talents in the field of national security and public security. Disciplinary development was not the priority of their work.

The second stage is from 1964 to 1979. The characteristic feature of this stage was the establishment of the three departments of international politics in three major universities in China,
Peking University, Remin University, and Fudan University. The three departments had a division of labor: Peking University for the study of the national liberation movements in the Third World, Remin University for the study of the communist movements in the world, and Fudan University for the study of IR in the Western world. These departments were set up to interpret the classics of revolutionary leaders such as Marx, Lenin, and Mao, and their foci were, accordingly, on the action-oriented theory such as Mao's ‘three-world’ theory and the ‘strategic triangle’ theory. But, at the same time, courses were offered to understand revolutionary leaders' thinking (such as Lenin's theory on imperialism), and Western thoughts were studied either as a means to understand the enemy or as a target of criticism. This pattern lasted until 1979 when China started its reform under Deng Xiaoping.

The third stage is from 1980 to the present. This is the period when IR as a discipline has witnessed its greatest development in China. The reform and opening-up has offered the Chinese IR community a good opportunity to have extensive exchanges with the rest of the world. Institutions have mushroomed in China. Up to 1979, there had been only three university departments and three specialized institutes doing IR-related education and research. The demand since 1979, thanks to the opening of the country, has been enormous. In 1980, the National Association of the History of International Relations was set up as the first nation-wide academic association in this field. In 1999, it changed its name into China National Association for International Studies (CNAIS) so as to have a clearer identity and wider coverage. The 2004 CNAIS expansion has enabled it to include all important institutions of IR in China and have 68 member institutions. The 2006 statistics of CNAIS shows that among Chinese universities and research institutes, there are 36 schools of IRs within universities, and 54 bachelor or master degree programs, and 29 doctoral degree programs in IRs. As a Chinese scholar has commented, among the major powers only the United States matches China in terms of the size of IR research and education (J. Wang, p.v.).

2.2 Learning through translation
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the first of Chinese students who had studied in Europe, the United States, and Japan started the learning process through translation. A most famous scholar–translator Yan Fu made great contributions to the Chinese academic and intellectual development by translating Adam Smith, Mill, and other Western thinkers. Since IR is a relatively young discipline in the West, the effort for translation has actually been made since 1979. Five major series of translations are particularly influential and many other publishers have also put out translated works in this field.

The first translation series began to come out in 1990 and the translation of Hans J. Morgenthau's Politics among Nations was the milestone. It was 42 years after its first edition was published in 1948. Even Waltz's work (Theory of International Relations) was 13 year after its publication in English. Although the translation had at least a 10-year time lag, the consciousness about theories as schemes of ideas and as explanations of IR phenomena began to emerge. This is a watershed, for only when the IR community distinguishes between the two concepts, i.e. IR research as an academic endeavor or as a policy instrument, can theory-consciousness come into being. This conscious distinction is particularly important in the Chinese context.
In the mid- and late-1990s, translation was paid even greater attention. It was consciously realized that there was a domination of Realism in the IR discourse in China and the learning process was very much leaning toward the misperception that Realism was the IRT. The end of the Cold War made this awareness even more in relief. New efforts were made to introduce theories other than Realism. Liberalism, Constructivism, the English School, and other theories have been introduced through translation (Qin, 2002, pp. 1–7). There has been a translation boom, and four more series have come out since then: Shanghai People's Publishing House's Oriental Translation Series, Zhejiang People's Publishing House's Contemporary Classics of IR Theory, World Affairs Press's Classics of IR Theory, and Peking University Press's New Directions in the Study of World Politics. In addition, these major publishers have done other Western IRT books (see Appendix for this translation boom).

Altogether, the five publishers have enabled 85 Western IRT works to be translated into Chinese by March, 2007 (see Appendix). In addition, other publishers have been doing similar work, having translating important IR works (Samuel Huntington, James Rosenau, Immanuel Wallerstein, etc.). Most of them have been done in the past five to six years. To some extent, it is translation that gave Chinese IR scholars a push for establishing an independent academic discipline. It is also translation that has made many Chinese scholars, especially the younger ones, follow the standards of the Western IR discipline. Now, almost all the major Western theories were introduced to the Chinese IR community and to graduate programs at the same time when they were published. There is little time lag now.

There have been, mainly because of the translation of Western IR theories, two conspicuous phenomena in the study of world politics in China. The first is the increasing emphasis on knowledge-based theory, stressing the academic dimension of disciplinary knowledge. The second is a strengthening of the dominance of the Western IR discourse, especially that of the United States (Hoffmann, 1997). As a result, three major theory-oriented research directions have emerged, Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism in the American IR community, which provide different understanding around the key IR concepts such as sovereignty, national interest, balance of power, norms, and identity (Y. Wang, 2006).

2.3 Progress in research programs
To understand the progress made in the Chinese IR community, we need to distinguish a three-phased theoretical development: the pre-theory phase, theory-learning phase, and theory-building phase. During the pre-theory phase, there is no consciousness about theory, and research is done mainly by individual experiences and intellectual wisdom. There may have a lot of relevant thoughts, but there is no conscious effort to turn the thoughts into a systematically constructed theoretical paradigm. Usually, the discipline concerned is mixed with other disciplines with no distinct identity.

When the academic community in the relevant field starts to have a collective consciousness and begins to produce an agenda for the second and third types of theory-related research, the theory-learning phase begins. During this phase, an increasing number of research products focus
on introduction and critical analysis of major theories, and there are research products that test major theories with the purpose of verification or falsification. New ideas may emerge, but no new theory that contains distinct significant ideas or core assumptions emerges. This learning is important and even crucial for evolvement of theory and development of the discipline, but alone it can hardly lead to a distinct theory.

The third phase is one of creation because new theory is put forward with distinct core assumptions and serves as a powerful explanation of the reality. When there is no readily available theory in the academic field concerned, scholars may turn to get inspiration from other related fields. When there exists theory in the discipline, they put forward new ones that fulfill two purposes: either to negate the old ones by falsifying their core assumptions or to establish a different set of core assumptions that define a new theory. When a national community reaches the third phase, we may say that a new school of thought has emerged and we may name it after the nation.

The three phases for China's IRT-related research are not difficult to observe. Let us take the year 1953 as the beginning of the IR discipline in China when the Department of Diplomatic Studies was set up in Renmin University. It is reasonable to say that 1953–89 was the first phase, or the pre-theory stage. At this stage, the term ‘theory’ was very much in its first meaning. It was action oriented. As a Chinese scholar observed, creation and development of IRT during a long period of time was a matter of such paramount importance that only top leaders could do, and IR researchers’ job was to provide information in advance and to offer interpretations afterwards (Zi, 1998, pp. 4–5). Potential theorizing based upon political leaders' strategic ideas was not even thought about. Thus, in the Chinese context, theory has been understood as guidelines for practice and action, policy statements of rules and principles to be followed, and strategies of the state to deal with the world and other actors.

Since theory was understood mainly as the policy and strategy put forward by political leaders, few had the consciousness and the luxury to think about theorizing in the knowledge-based sense. Some journals with a focus on IRs were created, but the articles carried on them, usually short and in the style of news journal commentaries, show that they were policy interpretation, background information, and description of current international events. In addition, almost no theories were systematically introduced from outside China. In 1964, when the three departments of international politics were set up; their tasks did not have a clear disciplinary orientation and they had little awareness of developing IRT in the sense of a ‘scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of facts of phenomena’. The dominant discourse was definitely not along the tradition of the Chinese intellectual culture. Table 1 shows the IR-related studies in this pre-theory period.

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The second phase is from 1990 to the present and four features stand out. The most conspicuous is an increasingly clear separation of policy interpretation and academic research. In fact in the late 1980s, the Chinese IR community began to realize that theory was not only guidelines for policy-making, but also perspectives from which people observe the IR world, hypotheses by which people test their abstraction of the IR world, and generalizations through which people understand the IR world.

The second is the mushrooming of publications that have been going together with the translation. Articles poured out on academic journals introducing and criticizing theories from outside China. The journal of Europe took the lead in setting up a column exclusively for IRT. Other journals, such as World Economics and Politics, began to pay great attention to the ‘academic’ dimension in the IR study and made contributions to this learning process. The development of Social Constructivism in China is a telling example. By the end of February, 2003, there have been seven academic monographs (including three translated works, two monographs, and two IRT books that include Constructivism) and 42 journal articles (including four translated ones, 28 theory analyses, and ten case studies) (Yang, 2003, pp. 21–22). In the two years of 2005–06, a total of 135 Constructivism-related articles were published and 71 were carried by the 13 key IR journals,

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<th>Year</th>
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aBetween 1979 and 1981, the journal was named *Reference about World Economy* and carried no IR-related articles.

bThe following criteria are used to choose IR-related articles: (i) articles that discuss events and issues related to international relations and (ii) articles whose core parts are about international politics (articles exclusively on economic affairs are thus excluded).

cThe following criteria are used to choose IRT-related articles: (i) IR-related articles that review certain IR theory/theories (for example, Waltz's Structural Realism) and (ii) IR-related articles that apply certain IR theory/theories for empirical studies (e.g. using Social Constructivism to analyze China's changed identity).
surpassing the number of Constructivism-related articles published from 1998 to 2004 (Editorial Department, 2006). Table 2 clearly shows this wave of introductory and critical analysis of IRT.

**Table 2** IR-related articles in the journals of *World Economics* and *Politics (WEP)* and *European Studies (ES)* (1990–2004)*a*

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>2004</td>
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*a*The reduced number of IR-related articles compared with that before 1990 was due to the fact that the journals have begun to publish much longer and more substantial research articles since 1990.

*b*Between 1990 and 1992, *European Studies* was named *Western European Studies* and carried no IR-related articles.

The third feature is that the research covers a range almost as wide as that in countries outside China. A recent study shows that in the period between 1996 and 2001, ten leading IR journals in China published 3,398 IR articles, covering nine issue areas [IR theory, great power relations, security, area studies, international organizations, international regimes, international political economy, human rights, and globalization/global governance (Wang, 2002)]. Another study shows
that the major topics covered by the US academic journals (International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, and Journal of Conflict Resolution) and policy journals (Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Washington Quarterly) were not covered as widely in Chinese journals, but the ‘attention paid to these issues has increased particularly in the last 2–3 years’.4 Furthermore, among all the topics, there is a steady increase in three research areas: (i) multilateralism and international institutions, (ii) international society, and (iii) non-state actors and global governance (Qin, 2002).

The fourth is that the consciousness of ‘schools of thought’ as a driving force for IRT development is beginning to show itself in the IR community. Because of the influence of the American IRT, the three mainstream IRT schools, Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism (largely in the Wendtian sense) all have followers and have developed rapidly (Y. Wang, 2006). Other IRTs, such as Feminism and Post-modernism, have found highly conscious advocates. Debates among these different schools in interpreting world politics have also surfaced. China's changed behavior, for example, has been explained, respectively, as strategic calculation, institutional behavior, and identity change. In addition, the feeling that there should be a Chinese School of IRT has become stronger and articles have been published in this respect, although very much at the metaphysical level. This debate has focused on such issues as whether the theory is always universal or can only be rooted in the history or collective memory of a people, whether a Chinese School or IRT with Chinese characteristic is able to emerge and evolve, and whether the positivist method should be the method for IR research. More recently, in-depth discussion on the Chinese worldview has also been carried out (Dan, 2005).

The greatest significance of the second phase, therefore, is the awareness of IRT as a knowledge-oriented construct rather than a mere instrument for policy interpretation. A great advancement is the practice of applying Western IRT to Chinese issues. The awareness and practice, however, have been achieved through a tenacious learning process, which has further enhanced the dominant role of Western IRT. The second stage is thus characterized by the modernizing program in IR through applying the Enlightenment ideas. The research programs have been getting increasingly close to those of the Western IRT.

As for the third phase, the stage of theory creation, there have been some encouraging signs, but its full appearance is yet to come. The defining feature of the third stage should be the emergence of new IRT. So far, the consciousness of developing a Chinese School of IRT has been increasingly awakened (Qin, 2005), together with a continued reinforcement of the Western definition and conceptualization of theory. In general, the present ‘state of the art’ is still a Western discourse in a Chinese context. Yet, there is no such theory that can be called Chinese IRT. I therefore argue that China's IRT development is at the second stage, with an increasing number of Type II and Type III products, while original paradigmatic theory is yet to emerge. Thus, now in China, we have a discipline of International Relations, but it is a discipline without theory of its own.

3. Why is there no Chinese IRT?
China has long intellectual traditions and IRs has been a highly attractive discipline in recent years with a rapid increase in IR programs as well as in the number of students working toward various levels of academic degrees. Thus, the fact that China has so far no major IRT is puzzling (Zi, 1998, pp. 12–13). Then, why is there no IRT that has originated in China? Three factors stand conspicuous in this respect: the lack of an awareness of ‘international-ness’, the dominance of the Western IRT discourse, and the absence of a theoretical hard core. I will discuss them in turn.

3.1 Lack of an Awareness of ‘International-ness’

The traditional Chinese intellectual mind had no room for something similar to the concept of ‘international-ness’, for there was no existence of a structure in which the ego stands against the other. The world or the state in the Chinese culture was not a clearly defined entity with infinite boundary. The Chinese world referred to everything under the heaven and on the earth. There was a sense of space, with a center and a gradually distancing periphery; there was a sense of time, for the generations of the Chinese in their thought and practice saw a continuous history and future distancing gradually from the present backward and forward (Hall and Ames, 2005, pp. 11–13). If you stand on top of the hill in the Imperial Garden behind the Forbidden City, you see a square-shaped complex of buildings surrounded by a larger square surrounded by an even larger square ... . This is the Chinese understanding of the world, which is infinite in space and time with the Chinese emperor's palace at the center. It was a complete whole where no dichotomous opposites existed. Thus, there was only one ego, a solitary ego without the alter.

This worldview of the traditional Chinese mind was practiced in the Tributary System, a system centering around and governed by the Chinese emperor from 221 BC to the early 1800s (Fairbank, 1992). States are like people. The Chinese traditionally took relations among states as relations among people. In this sense, a society of states had long been a concept in the Chinese mind. In this unequal, quasi-international system called the Tributary System, China was the dominant power, maintaining stability and providing institutionalized mechanisms for interaction among states in roughly nowadays East Asia (Swaine and Tellis, 2000).

The Tribute System is not an international system in its true sense. It was modeled on the system of the Chinese Zhou Dynasty (1046 BC–256 BC), which was an emperor–prince system with the emperor overriding the land and princes governing in their respective fiefdoms within the land. Without the idea and institution of sovereignty, the Chinese imperial court was the center and took the surrounding states as its dependants. The Tributary System was not a system of equal members, but it lasted without much change for 2000 years. China, as the most powerful state and the most advanced civilization in the region, played an overwhelming role in maintaining stability and trade, providing public goods, and governing the system. The tribute trade system saw more benefits going from China to the tribute states rather than the other way round. China also played the role of a balancer, intervening wherever in this region invasion by one vassal state against another, usually weaker, occurred (Fairbank, 1968; Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989).

The extended self, although having the same ontological status in nature, was not the same in social status. Distance away from the center made the difference in social status. This difference in status constituted the ordering principle of the Tributary System. The essence of the Tributary
System was the radiation of the ego, China as the ‘I’ at the center while other tributary states at the periphery paid tributes to the center. This is a system in which there was no distinction between the ego and the alter. The ontological status of the units of the system was at the same time the ontological status of the center. It was modeled on the Confucian notion of the ‘state’, which in turn was model on the Confucian concept of the ‘family’ (Confucius, 1997). Thus, the world was in essence an enlarged family or an enlarged state.

When Fairbank said that the Tributary System was not an inter-state system, but a world system, he touched on a crucial issue about this China-centered system: there were no equal, though perhaps only de jure, units in it. It was not ‘inter-national, because no legal equality existed among units and therefore there were no like units as Waltz says (Waltz, 1997). The Tributary System was a mere enlarged system of the Chinese domestic system and the two in fact were one in the traditional Chinese mind. Thus, the Tributary System, spatially and conceptually, was like concentric squares of the Forbidden City, with only difference in distance and without difference in ontology. The periphery was the radiation of the center and therefore the dualistic positioning between the ego and the alter did not exist at all.

Such a system had no room for ‘international-ness’. Traditionally, therefore, Chinese had no consciousness of ‘international-ness’ and concepts related with it such as sovereignty and territorial integrity. It was natural that there was no need to develop a theory of IR. When the first professorship was set up in University of Wales at Aberystwyth immediately after World War I, most Chinese still believed that ‘Half of The Analects is enough to govern the whole world’.

3.2 The dominance of the Western IR discourse
China's rich intellectual traditions could provide sources for IRT. However, the failure in modernization when China met the West in the mid- and late-nineteenth century broke the genealogy of the intellectual culture. The amazing power of the West, the sudden realization by the Chinese of their backwardness, and the changed ideas about their country, their traditions and themselves, put together, made an unbridgeable fault in Chinese intellectual history. Therefore, the collapse of the Tributary System was in fact the collapse of the Chinese cultural tradition as well as the collapse of the Chinese state.

The cultural consequences of the Opium War (1840–42), however, were much greater and deeper than the defeat in the battlefields. The defeat in the mid-1840s made the Chinese believe that their backward technologies were the cause: the Westerners used firearms whereas the Chinese could only wield their spears and knives. As a result of this belief, the Westernization Movement was initiated mainly by high-ranking Chinese officials to improve China's military technologies. They insisted that the Chinese learning be the essence and the Western learning for mere practical application.

By the late 1800s, however, they began to felt that not only their technologies were backward, but the Chinese institutions of ruling and governance were wrong. Officials and scholars questioned the institutional system. The 1898 reform initiated by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao and the 1911 Revolution led by Dr. Sun Yet-sen both sought a change in the political system and its
institutions. When people began to question their political and economic systems, they moved from the pure technological level to the institutional level. This lasted until the May 4 Movement in 1919 (Li, 2003, pp. 309–338).

The May 4 movement witnessed perhaps the greatest self-reflection of the Chinese intellectuals, for they began not only to question the Chinese technology, the Chinese political and economic systems, but also the Chinese culture with Confucianism at the heart. Two major camps were emerging in categorical opposition. One was the Chinese-learning School, represented by modern Neo-Confucianists. They advocated the spirit of Confucianism and tried to transform it to be applicable in a modernizing context. They argued very strongly that Confucianism was the knowledge for cultivating one's moral character and developing one's temperament, thus having the superiority for humanities. The second is the Western-learning School. They believed that the fundamental problem of the failed modernization in China was the Chinese culture: its backwardness, conservative nature, and neglect of sciences. They advocated ‘wholesale Westernization’, believed that Confucianism was the murdering doctrine, and shouted the slogan ‘Down with Confucianism!’ The confrontation of the two schools of thought in China thus reflected the confrontation of the two cultures. The Chinese Marxists in the early years were, to some extent, scholars of the second school (Li, 2003; Zhang and Guo 2003; Ge, 2001).

The traditional Chinese-learning School took the Chinese learning as the end and the Western learning as the means, whereas the Western-learning School advocated for the opposite. Although there was no official declaration as to who won, it was clear that the Western-learning School got the upper hand and was becoming the dominant discourse in China. This was the victory of the Enlightenment ideas and of the Newtonian culture. In this sense, China started her modernization process by engaging herself in international interactions and through the forced teaching by the Westphalian Westerner, especially the concept of international-ness and sovereignty.

The parallel developments – the collapse of the Tributary System and the great debates among intellectuals – have left the Chinese with two opposite traditions: the Confucian and the Western. It seems that at the time Confucianism was the symbol of conservatism and backwardness, the only teacher was the West. In fact, while the West has a fairly clear main thread throughout the intellectual culture since the Renaissance, the Chinese saw a greatest discontinuity of their intellectual culture when the West met the East. As the Chinese culture with Confucianism as its core was confronted and defeated at the turn of the twentieth century, the belief system contained in it disintegrated accordingly. This made the Chinese reflect on their culture from inside.

In such a context, no matter what you theorize about, its soul is Western. Therefore, no distinct Chinese School of IRT, as well as any other social theory, can be established.5 This situation has continued to the present. For 30 years, from 1949 to 1979, there was a partial discontinuity. Since 1979, especially when China's IR entered its learning stage and tried to be an independent discipline, the process was resumed and learning from the West has become a major drive of the Chinese IR community. The translation effort discussed above and the large market for Western IR classics are telling examples.6
The reform that started in China in the 1980s encouraged enormously Chinese IR scholars to develop the discipline. It happened that it was also the time when the Waltzianization of IRT began to dominate in the United States and Waltz's understanding as to what IRT is was becoming the standard of IRT. By early- and mid-1990s, the great desire of the Chinese IR scholars for acquiring IRT knowledge, the great efforts made by the returned students to introduce Western IRT classics, and the Waltzinization of IRT established the dominance of Western IRT, especially that of the United States, as the dominant discourse in China. As China was searching for knowledge-based social theory, it was perhaps a stage both natural and necessary for the development of social sciences. However, to stay or go beyond is the question.

3.3 Lack of a Theoretical Hard Core

Social theory must have a hard core. In the learning process, what is missing in China’s IR community is just this element. Imre Lakato takes a series of theory as a research program and his research program has the essential features of a system, with a core and a protective belt, each playing its own functions. What is most relevant here is his argument that any research program has a hard core, distinct and different from that of any other research program (Lakatos, 1978, p. 6). This hard core identifies a theory. Once a new hare core is formed, a new theory is born. Although Lakatos does not discuss it fully, he explains that the formation of a research program starts from an initial ‘model’, which gradually grows, with painstaking efforts, into a research program (Lakatos, 1970). This process is similar to ‘nucleation’, the formation of the nucleus or the hard core of a theory.

If this argument stands, we need to ask a crucial question about any particular theory: what is its hard core? In natural science, it is easier to answer. The principle of gravitation, for example, constitutes the hard core of the Newtonian Theory. It is the description of a causal relationship that accounts for the fact that an apple drops down to the earth rather than flies up to the sky. In social studies, however, it is much more complex, for it aims not only to find regularities and causal relationships, but also to understand meanings in a social context. I argue that the nucleus of a social theory contains two components: one is physical/material and the other metaphysical/ideational. The former, like the first-order questioning framework, is related to the material world and the latter, like the second-order framework, is related to the speculative world. According to this conceptualization, the physical component of the hard core leads to core assumptions and hypotheses of a theory about the world out there, whereas the metaphysical component produces the ontological essence. While the hypotheses developed from the physical part of the hard core are based on empirical experience at a particular point of time and space and subject to empirical verification and falsification, the ideas that spring from the metaphysical component are cultural sediments of history, not subject to such empirical scrutiny. By definition, they are speculative ideas that do not come from reality (although they are related to reality and can create reality). This component is formed over years in the cultural context of a people: their history, their intellectual tradition, their world outlook, their universal vision, and their way of life and of thinking – their culture.

The two components are interrelated and interactive. When a real-world problem arises, the physical component is activated and represents this problem as one that needs solutions. Then, as
the problem is represented as such, it goes through the metaphysical component to find the answer as to how to understand, interpret, and solve this problem. Where the two components are well coordinated and play complementary functions, a theory may emerge. When we say a theory as a distinct or original one, we mean that either the theoretical question is represented by the physical component in a different way or the understanding is offered by the metaphysical component in a different way. The latter is particularly important, for it defines a distinct social theory.

Scholarly discussion in Western IR often neglects this metaphysical component of a theory's core, which is exactly a most important part in traditional Chinese philosophy (Feng, 2005). Perhaps, this is either because they take it for granted or because they have a similar second-order mind-set that can go back to the ancient Greek philosophy, the Renaissance and especially the Enlightenment. William A. Callahan compares the American IRT, the English School, and the IRT with Chinese characteristics, arguing that any theory with a national identity must have a big idea: for the American IRT, it is Democratic Peace; for the English School, International Society; and for the Chinese IRT, the Datong (Universal Great Harmony). A big idea qualifies a big theory (Callahan, 2002, p. 4, 6). What Callahan does not ask is why they – the American, the British, and the Chinese – have different big ideas. While he stresses the hegemonic nature of the big idea along the Gramcian tradition, I stress more the cultural and ideational characteristic of such a big idea. To me, this big idea is not completely from the reality at the present. It is the present problem perceived through a particular cultural and historical lens and conceived through a particular representational system. It is the working of the metaphysical component on the physical component's reaction to international anarchy.

A big idea is often related to a big problematic. A theory must have a distinct problematic that develops into a hard core and makes the theory alive and alone (Qin, 2005). Many of the mainstream IRTs in the United States have one thing in common – how to solve the big problem the Unites States as the hegemon faces in the post-World War II international system or hegemonic maintenance (Morgenthau, 1973; Organski and Kugler, 1980; Gilpin, 1981; Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Kennedy, 1989). No matter whether it is the emphasis on hard power or soft power (Mearsheimer, 2001; Nye, 2002, 2004) and no matter whether it is the maintenance of the hegemon's power position or the hegemonic system as a whole, the big problem the United States has faced in the post-War era constitutes the core of all these theories (Qin, 1999). Thus, a big idea is based on the big problem an international actor, such as a nation-state, faces. However, in both Callahan's article and my own, the focus is on derivatives of the physical component of the hard core. The problem is specific, relevant, conspicuous, and present. It worries the theorist and the policy maker alike. It needs solutions. As Robert Cox says, 'Theory is always for someone and for some purpose' (Cox, 1986, p. 207). In this sense, theory is a tool, a tool to solve the problem an actor faces. What these articles do not discuss, or what is absent, is the other component: the metaphysical component. When a problem presents itself to the human mind, solutions to it do not come out of nothing. The Chinese way of leadership or domination in the Tributary System was very different from that of the United States in the post-World War II and post-Cold War situations, although their problem was somewhat similar, i.e. how to maintain the dominance or leadership (Qin, 1999; Womack, 2006). The problem is understood, reflected, and represented by the mind. The representational system makes one solution possible and another impossible or even
inconceivable. The representation is culture-specific and path-dependent. This is what the metaphysical or second-order component of the hard core of a theory is all about. It is the being of a theory and part of a culture, of way of life and thinking that has been formed (and transformed) through the history of human practice. This metaphysical component decides the identity of a theory, distinguishing one theory from another. Because of it, any social theory is ethnocentric in nature and in the beginning.

The Chinese intellectual tradition used to have a core with a distinct metaphysical component. But the failed modernization at the beginning of the twentieth century broke it up. In its long and tortuous struggle with the modern international system, China had been reconstructing its identity. Such a re-construction of the Chinese intellectual culture resulted inevitably in the collapse of the metaphysical component of the Chinese tradition and the formation of one similar to that of the Western Enlightenment mindset began at the same time in the struggle against the tradition. International thoughts, like those in other fields, followed this path and moved farther away from the indigenous Chinese system of intellectual ideas and concepts. The development of the study of IR has reflected this trend and witnessed its strengthening step by step. The natural consequence that came from the collapse of the metaphysical component of the Chinese intellectual culture and its replacement by a Western one was that the study of IR began to employ the Western text within a Chinese context.

4. Potential sources for a Chinese School of IRT

It is possible and even inevitable that a Chinese School of IRT will emerge. Since social theory and human practice are twins, interactive with each other in an ongoing progress, it is likely that distinct Chinese IRT will be developed during the period of great social transformation that China has been undergoing. I will discuss three potential sources for a Chinese School of IRT, each being a pair of thought and practice.

4.1 The ‘Tianxia’ worldview and the Tributary System

Confucianism has an important concept about the universe or the Tianxia worldview, by which the Tribute System was rationalized and explained. Literally Tianxia means ‘space under the heaven’. But this concept in the traditional Chinese mind was much more than the natural world and a geographically defined area. It was a combination of nature, super-nature, and morality. Thus, it was not a mere material thing out there. It was more a cultural concept containing the system of morality, or the way of the heaven.

The Tributary System, based upon the Tianxia philosophy, is a system of inequality. This is the part that goes against human desire for equal recognition and it is perhaps the most important cause for the collapse of the Tributary System when it clashed with the Westphalian one. However, there are some other important ideas and practices in this system as well as in the philosophy that may be quite positive. The first is the holist approach. Since Tianxia was a combined whole, the concept of the subjectivity, or the subjective ‘I’, was not conspicuous at all and therefore there existed no dichotomy of the self and the other (Feng, 1991). As a result, in the Chinese mind, there
could be something far away in time and space, but there was never something that was opposite, intolerant, and needed conquering. The far-away was indeed an extension of the self, like great grandfather and the great grandsons in the temporal framework or the center of a ripple and its gradually spreading circles in the spatial framework. This holist worldview is different from the Western dualistic view of the two opposites, where an inevitable conflict is implied.

The second is the highest ideal of the Tianxia philosophy – Datong, meaning an ideal world of harmony and order based upon morality and selflessness, and between the human and nature. In a dualistic philosophy, great harmony is impossible, as Keohane's distinction between harmony and coordination indicates (Keohane, 1984). In a holist worldview, however, it is not only possible, but also inevitable, for the seemingly opposite elements always complement each other. Tianxia is a concept that takes care of the whole world, believing in and aiming at a harmonious whole. It was the space where human and nature met, where the ideal and the reality met, and where the moral and the material met. Thus, Tianxia is both a physical and a cultural concept, able to extend Datong to the natural world and to realize the ideal of ‘unity of the nature and the human’. In an increasingly globalized world, such a holist worldview may help shape new theory as well as new mind. The Western IRT discusses more the international-ness of world politics, which discusses politics in a non-world, whereas the Tianxia concept contains a strong world view, while this is a world of hierarchy. When international-ness is of less relevance in a globalizing world and individual equality of more significance in a more power-diffusing world society, a combination of the Chinese and the Western, rather than a dichotomous division of the two, could provide insight for the development and even revolution of IRT.

The third is order. For the Confucian philosophy, order is the most important principle in society (He et al., 1991). The Tributary System started with the idea of unequal social relationships, but this unequal relationship, in the eye of the Confucian scholar, was not that between the animals in the Hobbesian jungle, equal and hostile; not that between the humans in the Lockean society, equal and competitive; not even that between the members in the Kantian culture, equal and friendly. Rather, it was that between father and sons in the Confucian family, unequal but benign. At least, this was the ideal relationship in the traditional Chinese mind and the foundation of the appropriate social order. Since from the very beginning it does not assume a jungle, but a society, what hangs the members together is the rituals, norms, and institutions contained in Confucianism and practiced in the Chinese dynastical system. The core was the five relationships (father–son, emperor–minister, elder brother–younger brother, husband–wife, and friend–friend) and the four social bonds (propriety, righteousness, honesty, and a sense of shame), which have been established as the core of the Chinese way of governance. The governance and authority based on these social relationships and bonds was termed ‘Lizhi’, meaning governing by ethical codes or morality. It contained the logic of appropriateness, similar to that discussed by Finnemore (1996).

Thus, the Tianxia philosophy and the Tributary System contain something conspicuously different from the Western international philosophy, unable to be explained or understood in the Western IR discourse. While it is necessary to abandon the assumption of inequality therein, it is also necessary to explore the positive components, such as the holist approach, institutional order, and ruling by morality, or, put it simply, the Tianxia worldview and the Datong ideal.
4.2 Modernization philosophy and the Chinese revolutions

China began to have a clear awareness of modernity when the Opium War broke out. From Kang Youwei and Yan Fu to Sun Yet-sun and Mao Zedong, reform and revolution had become the overwhelming theme in the Chinese drive for modernization (Spence, 1990). The modern ideas, such as sovereignty and nationalism, were the results of the forced open door of the country and the product of the recent collective reflection. Revolution constituted the most important intellectual ideal and the popular practice. It became the dominant theme for intellectuals and masses alike, its goal being to break up the old China and set up a new one.

In this revolutionary drive, there were three clashes that helped shape the later generations of the Chinese. The first is the clash between the Tributary System and the Westphalian System, ending up in the defeat of the former. The Tributary System was criticized for its principle of inequality and it is gone forever in this particular sense. Since the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, equality has become a norm, a value, and an ideal universally accepted. Although inequality exists de facto in both the domestic and international realms, it has been the target of many revolutions and reform movements. The revolutionary thought, very much shaped by the Western ideas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, took as irrational and feudal the traditional Chinese worldview and the order based upon unequal social relationships. To break this order thus became the objective of the revolution.

The second was the clash between the Chinese philosophy centered on order and an introversive rationality governing human relations and the Western intellectual tradition of competition and an extroversive rationality based on materialism. The traditional Chinese philosophy focused on human relations, therefore implying soft institutionalism, stressing the emotional dynamics of human behavior and striving for appropriate interpersonal relationships; the Western philosophy focused on materialistic gains, therefore stressing the rational part of human behavior and striving for relative gains in relationships between the human and the nature as well as among the human beings. The clash resulted in the defeat of the Chinese philosophy and material gains were given priority as a reflection of human rationality.

The third was the clash between the Chinese holistic approach of understanding the universe and the Western individualistic way of discovering the world. Learning from the West started from the desire to have a strong and prosperous nation-state. Together with it was the inevitable acceptance of many Western ideas, among which sovereignty was perhaps the most important in terms of relations with nations in the world. Equality was based upon the independence of individuals and thus eroded the concept of ‘Tianxia’. The dualistic view began to take roots. The revolutions that have undergone in China's modern history, if we look back at all of them, are imbued with the dichotomous distinction between the ‘ego’ and the hostile ‘alter’.

Influential ideas have been born out of these clashes. Since the period starting in 1840 was so important in the history of modern China, revolutionary ideas and practices must be important sources of a Chinese School of IRT. Examples include Marx's theory on class struggle and Lenin's on imperialism, as well as Mao's theory on the united front, on the leaning against one side, and on
the three worlds, all of which started from drawing a clear line between the ‘we’ and the ‘they’, or between the ‘friend’ and the ‘enemy’. A consistent strategy of Mao was to distinguish among three categories: ‘we’, ‘ally’, and ‘enemy’. Then, ‘we’ should unite our ally against our enemy. Domestically, Mao believed that there were different classes, some of which were allies and others were enemies. Internationally, it was similar. Mao's three-world theory in fact was a theory that distinguished the ‘we’, the ‘ally’, and the ‘enemy’. From Mao's thinking, we can see a strong influence of the Marxist theory of irreconcilable class struggle and the dialectic methodology of thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis (Mao, 1937a, b).

From the 1898 Reform to the 1911 Revolution to the Communist Revolution, the idea and practice had been dominantly revolutionary. It is natural that the Russian way of revolution was believed and practiced in China. Since this went hand in hand with the modern history of China and the 100-year humiliation complex, it helped shape the mind-set of Chinese when they were entering the world.

4.3 Reformist thinking and the integration into the international system
The reform and opening up initiated in the late 1970s has brought about the great economic development and social transformation. The idea that started the reform came from the pragmatic thinking of Deng Xiaoping that China should develop its economy and Chinese people should get rich. When a few farmers in a remote, poor village decided to do away with the collective farming system, their idea was very simple: they needed food so as not to get starved. It was Deng who made timely use of this event and set on motion the reform all over the country. This was a fundamental breakup with the revolutionary tradition and mentality. The reform ideas and practices have brought about significant changes in the Chinese life, exerting great influence on the mind-set of the people. Three decades have passed, leaving us valuable legacies for developing China's IRT. Three changes that have been undergoing are of particular importance.

The first is institutional. Deng's reform is different from that of Khrushchev, for Deng from the very beginning linked reform with opening China to the outside world. Reform and opening up, therefore, have been twins, complementing and reinforcing each other. The legitimacy of the reformers in China thus rests, to a large extent, on the opening-up. Because of Deng's reform and his successors' continued effort, China has not only undergone rapid economic growth, but also institutional changes. The process of teaching by international institutions and learning by the Chinese has been obvious. By 2004, China had joined 266 international multilateral conventions and most of the international governmental organizations. Accordingly, China has made great adjustments to adapt its domestic institutions to international regimes, norms, and standards. The idea of joining the international system and the practice of China in the past three decades are both nutrition for a possible Chinese School of IRT.

The second change is social, i.e. the change in China's identity. I use the concept of national identity to refer to what a state is in relation to international society in terms of the identification between the two. China has been experiencing a redefinition of its national identity, i.e. a transformation from a revolutionary state to a status quo state, from an outsider to a member of international society. The transformation started in the early 1970s and gained substantial
The third change is ideational. The main theme for modern China since 1840 had been revolution. As the reform by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao was denounced as daydreams, violent revolution became the idea and practice of the nation. Since 1911, revolution after revolution had broken out in China. The Cultural Revolution was the culmination of the waves of revolutions. The ideas behind all the revolutions are those nurtured and cultivated in the fight against the traditional values and norms of the Chinese culture. China's reform and opening-up three decades ago was the beginning of a non-revolution era. With the rapid tangible development, it is natural and necessary that ideational changes have been taken place, with a revival of the traditional and the attraction of the Western. International norms and traditional values have gradually come back as inspiring ideas. At the same time, other modern concepts and sentiments, such as nationalism, are also influencing the Chinese. The ideational change is much more fundamental than the visible change in economic development and an increase in national capabilities.

These changes are characteristic of the reform era in China. They are significant and fundamental, leaving a valuable legacy for those who aim at developing a Chinese School of IRT.

5. Conclusion: the core problematic of a Chinese School of IRT

We have discussed three sources from which a potential Chinese School of IRT could draw nutrition. However, as mentioned above, there must be a central problematic around which the hard core of a social theory could be formed. The Chinese IR community has been still fumbling for it. I argue that the most likely core problematic is the relationship between China and international society.

This is a century puzzle, a fundamental problem of identity. In the 2000-year Tributary System, China did not have such a problem, for the Chinese worldview contained nothing like sovereignty, nationalism, and internationalism. In the 140 years from 1840 to 1980, China had always faced the problem of its relationship with the international system, but never had an appropriate solution to it. In fact, during those 140 years, China had been an outsider, trying, hesitating, and staring into a strange and sometimes hostile universe. The Qing Dynasty failed to solve it; neither the later Chinese governments. In the early 1950s China, having finished the civil war, began to develop, but the Cold War and the domestic chaos prevented the Chinese from tackling this problem.

It is the reform and opening in 1979 that enabled China to come close to a solution as China has been entering international society. How to get inspiration from the three sources of the thinking and practice and how to draw nutrition from the Western IR and social thoughts – these are questions to which answers should be provided if a Chinese school is to emerge in the era of globalization.
Appendix

Translated IR books by five leading publishers in China

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<th>Publisher</th>
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<tr>
<td>China People's Public Security University Press (seven books)</td>
<td>Burton, J.W., Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gilpin, R., War and Change in World Politics\textsuperscript{a}</td>
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<td>Kaplan, M.A., System and Process in International Politics</td>
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<td>Keohane, R. and Nye, J., Power and Interdependence (1st edn.)</td>
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<td>Mogenthau, H.J., Politics among Nations</td>
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<td>Camilleri, J.A. and Falk, J., The End of Sovereignty</td>
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<td>Baldwin, D., Neorealism and Neoliberalism</td>
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<td>De Derian, J., International Theory: Critical Investigations</td>
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<td>Finnmore, M., National Interests in International Society</td>
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<td>Krasner, S., Structural Conflict</td>
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<td>Lapid, Y. and Kratochwill, F. (eds), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory</td>
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<td>Ruggie, J.G., Multilateralism Matters</td>
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<td>Sylvester, C., Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era</td>
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Art, R., *A Grand Strategy for America*

Berridge, G.R., *Diplomacy*

Berridge, G.R., Keens-Soper, M. and Otte, T.G., *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*

Diamond, L. and McDonald, J., *Multi-track Diplomacy*

Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. (eds), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*

Holsti, K.J., *Peace and War*

Ikenberry, J. (ed.), *America Unrivaled*

Keck, M. and Sikkink, K., *Activists beyond Borders*

Keohane, R. (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*


Keohane, R. and Milner, H.V., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*

Keohane, R., *Liberalism, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*

Kubalkova, V., Onuf, N. and Kowert, P., *International Relations in a Constructed World*

Morgenthau, H.J., *Politics among Nations*, 7th edn. (Revised by Kenneth Thompson and David Clinton)

Nester, W., *International Relations*

Neumann, I. and Waever, O., *The Future of International Relations*

Nye, J., *Hard and Soft Power*

Pearson, F. and Payaslian, S., *International Political Economy*

Rana, K., *Bilateral Diplomacy*


Starkey, B., Boyer, M., and Wikenfeld, J., *Negotiating a Complex World*

Rourke, J., *International Politics on the World Stage*

Strange, S., *The Retreat of the State*

Thompson, K.W., *Masters of International Thought*
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<td>Shanghai People's Publishing House</td>
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- Thompson, K.W., *Fathers of International Thought*
- Thompson, K.W., *Schools of Thought in International Relations*
- Van Evera, S., *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*
- Bull, H., *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*
- Carr, E., *The Twenty Years' Crisis*
- Cox, R., *Production, Power and World Order*
- Jervis, R., *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*
- Kennedy, P. (ed.), *Grand Strategy in War and Peace*
- Murray, W. (ed.), *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War*
- Nye, J., *Governance in a Globalizing World*
- Odell, J.S., *Negotiating the World Economy*
- Rodrik, D., *The New Global Economy and Developing Countries*
- Wight, M., *Power Politics*
- Acharya, A., *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*
- Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities*
- Buzan, B., *The United States and the Great Power*
- Calleo, D.P., *Rethinking Europe's Future*
- Brzezinski, Z., *The Grand Chessboard*
- Codevilla, A.M., *The Character of Nations*
- Falkenrath, R.A., *et al.*, *America's Achilles' Heel*
- Gilpin, R., *The Challenge of Global Capitalism*
- Held, D., *Democracy and the Global Order*
Kupchan, C.A., *The End of the American Era*

Gilpin, R., *Global Political Economy*

Gilpin, R., *The Political Economy of International Relations*

Hobsbawm, E.J., *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*

Johnson, C., *The Sorrow of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*

Katzenstein, P.J., Keohane, R.O., and Krasner, S.D. (eds), *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*

Krueger, A.O. (ed.), *The WTO as an International Organization*

Keohane, R., *After Hegemony*

Lippmann, W., *Public Opinion*

Martin, L.L. and Simmons, B.A., *International Institutions: An Introduction*

Mearsheimer, J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*


Nye, J., *Understanding International Conflict*

Oren, I., *Our Enemies and US*


Rohwer, J., *Asia Rising: Why America will Prosper as Asia's Economies Boom*


Van Evera, S., *Causes of War*

Waltz, K., *Theory of International Politics*

Wendt, A., *Social Theory of International Politics*

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*It was included in the same series, but published by another publisher (Renmin University Press).*

*This is a book Keohane prepared specially for the publication in China.*
Notes

1 It is now called China Foreign Affairs University, directly under the Foreign Ministry of China.

2 It is now the People's Public Security University of China.

3 It refers to the triangular relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.

4 Alastair Iain Johnston's article takes into account 16 terms and calculates their frequency in China's academic journals. The 16 terms are democratic peace, feminism, non-traditional security, global governance, multipolarity, interdependence, ethnic conflict, identity, crisis management, psychology, IGOs, international political economy, peace research, international organization, multilateralism, and regional organization (Johnston, 2002, pp. 141–142).

5 As a Chinese scholar has pointed out, China has twice in its intellectual history made major efforts to introduce foreign ideas and philosophies. The first is the introduction of Buddhism before the twentieth century and the second the introduction of Western philosophy. The key difference between these two major introductions lies in the fact that the first is to use Chinese theoretical and analytical framework to explain the foreign text, whereas the second is to use the Western theoretical and analytical framework to study and explain Chinese phenomena. The second situation is very much what is happening in almost all the social sciences in China today (Liu, 2006).

6 A phenomenon worth noting is that in recent years Chinese doctoral dissertations in the IR field are more like those of the United States, having the sections of literature review, theoretical framework, hypotheses, testing (usually by cases), and conclusion. Most of the theories used are Western ones, with Waltz, Keohane, and Wendt as the most often cited theorists.

7 Wendt uses the term second-order question, which is concerned with ‘the fundamental assumptions about social inquiry: the nature of human agency and its relationship to social structure, the role of ideas and material forces in social life, the proper form of social explanations, and so on’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 5). I mainly take the non-material and ideational dimensions of the second-order framework.

8 For example, it is argued that there is a fundamental difference between the Chinese and the Western minds: the former tend to have what is called the correlative thinking while the latter, the causal thinking (Hall and Ames, 2005, pp. 22–23).

9 For most realists, the most crucial issue is the maintenance of the hegemon's own power position, whereas for most liberals, it seems that the maintenance of the hegemonic system with its value and order is at least equally important (Keohane, 1984; Nye, 1990). Recently, Wendtian Constructivism has been also criticized for its attempt to integrate the world into an ideational
structure based on the value of the hegemon (Barkins, 2003, 2004; Shaw, 2000).
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